Flow watermarks efficiently link packet flows in a network in order to thwart various attacks such as stepping stones. We study the problem of designing good flow watermarks. Earlier flow watermarking schemes mostly considered substitution errors, neglecting the effects of packet insertions and deletions that commonly happen within a network. More recent schemes considered packet deletions but often at the expense of the watermark visibility. We present an invisible flow watermarking scheme capable of enduring a large number of packet losses and insertions. To maintain invisibility, our scheme uses quantization-index-modulation (QIM) to embed the watermark into interpacket delays, as opposed to time intervals including many packets. As the watermark is injected within individual packets, packet losses and insertions may lead to watermark desynchronization and substitution errors. To address this issue, we add a layer of error-correction coding to our scheme. Experimental results on both synthetic and real network traces demonstrate that our scheme is robust to network jitter, packet drops, and splits, while remaining invisible to an attacker.
Invisible Flow Watermarks for Channels as Tor [2] , where anonymity is compromised once end flows are correctly matched. As network connections are often encrypted, it is infeasible to link flows directly relying on packet contents. However, matching flows using side information such as packet times is possible, as their values remain to some extent unchanged even after encryption [3] [4] [5] .
Earlier work in flow linking was based on long observation of flow characteristics, such as the number of ON/OF periods [4] . Such passive techniques are fragile vis-a-vis network artifacts and require long observation periods to avoid large false alarm rates. Flow watermarking, an active approach, was suggested as an improvement. In this approach, a pattern, the watermark, is injected into the flow with the hope that the flow stays traceable after traversing the network as long as the same pattern can be later extracted [2] , [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] . Unlike passive schemes, flow watermarking is highly reliable and works effectively on short flows.
The challenge of designing good flow watermarks is to keep the injected pattern robust to network artifacts yet invisible to watermark attackers 1 . The robustness requirement guarantees that the injected pattern survives network artifacts, while the invisibility property prevents watermark removal attempts by active attackers. Most state-of-the-art schemes currently trade off one of the two properties at the expense of the other. In the so called interval based schemes [2] , [8] , a flow is divided into intervals, and all packets within selected intervals are shifted to form a watermark pattern. Given that a few packets would not greatly affect the pattern created in the entire interval, these schemes are robust against network artifacts such as packet drops and splits. However, shifting a large number of packets produces noticeable 'traces' of the embedded watermarks and thus compromises the invisibility requirement [11] . In interpacket-delay (IPD) based schemes [6] , [9] , the delays between consecutive packets are modulated to embed watermarks. Since only a small perturbation is introduced in each interarrival time, watermarks are not visible. The drawback of this approach is that any packet loss or insertion during transmission can cause watermark desynchronization and severe decoding errors.
In this paper, we present a new IPD-based flow watermarking scheme where invisible watermark patterns are injected in the interarrival-time of successive packets. We treat the network as a channel with substitution, deletion, and bursty insertion errors caused by jitter, packet drops, and packet splits or retransmission, respectively, and introduce an insertion, deletion and sub- 1 The goal of watermark attackers is to prevent the success of flow linking by disrupting the detection or altogether removing the watermarks from the flow.
1556-6013 © 2013 IEEE stitution (IDS) error-correction coding scheme to communicate the watermark reliably over the channel. At the same time, we preserve watermark invisibility by making unnoticeable modifications to packet times using the QIM framework [12] . Through experiments on both synthetic and real network traces, we show that our scheme performs reliably in presence of network jitter, packet losses and insertions. Furthermore, we verify the watermark invisibility using Kolmogorov-Smirnov [13] and multiflow-attack tests [11] .
Deletion correction codes were first applied to flow watermarking in [1] , where watermarks can be decoded correctly after packet losses as long as the first packet in the flow was not dropped. In this work, we extend our decoder to handle more realistic network environments where not only packet losses but also packet insertions occur. Furthermore, synchronization requirement on the first packet is relaxed. To verify the performance of our scheme, traffic traces collected from real SSH connections are tested. This improves the simulation setup in [1] , where merely simulated synthetic traffic was used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Background on flow watermarking appears in Section II. We describe notations and definitions in Section III. Our proposed scheme is presented in Section IV. We evaluate the performance of our scheme using synthetic and real traffic traces in Section V.
II. BACKGROUND
This section covers some background material on flow watermarking. First, we describe three application scenarios of flow watermarking. Second, we discuss some principles for designing good watermarking schemes, which is followed by a list of watermark attack models. We conclude by surveying the literature.
A. Applications
We begin with a stepping-stone detection scenario where flow watermarks are used to find hidden network attackers. Fig. 1 depicts an attacker Bob who wants to attack a victim Alice without exposing his identity. Bob first remotely logins to a compromised intermediate host Charlie via SSH [14] . Then he proceeds by sending attack flows to Alice from Charlie's machine. Tracing packet flows sent to Alice's machine would implicate Charlie instead of Bob as the attacker. Hosts like Charlie, exploited to hide the real attack source, are called as stepping stones [3] . In real life, attackers may hide behind a chain of stepping stones, making it hard for the victim, who only sees the last hop, to determine the origin of the attack. Fortunately, flow watermarking is a solution for tracing the attack source. Notice that an interactive connection is maintained along Bob-Charlie-Alice during the above stepping stone attack. Hence Alice can secretly embed a watermark in the packet flow heading back to Charlie. As this flow travels back to Bob, the watermark could be subsequently detected by the intermediate routers (or firewalls), revealing the attack path and its true origin [15] , [16] .
Another scenario of stepping-stone attack occurs in enterprise networks, as shown in Fig. 2(a) . Here, intruders are trying to compromise hosts in an enterprise network to relay their malicious traffic [11] , [17] . To discover this kind of stepping stones within the network, an enterprise can add watermarks on all in- Fig. 1 . Detecting attackers behind stepping stones. Bob uses Charlie as a stepping stone to attack Alice so that his identity remains hidden from Alice. To traceback the origin of this attack, Alice injects a watermark on the flow sent back to the stepping stone. The path leading to Bob is exposed as every router along this path detects Alice's watermark on flows passing through. coming flows, and then terminate outgoing flows that contain the watermark since they most probably come from stepping stones. In a similar fashion, flow watermarking may be applied to attacking anonymous network systems [14] , [18]- [20] . In order to hide the identities of communicating parties, an anonymous network shuffles all the flows passing through it, as shown in Fig. 2(b) . If an attacker somehow discovers the hidden mappings between incoming and outgoing flows, the anonymity is compromised. Akin to the previous enterprise network scenario, this can be achieved by marking all incoming flows with watermarks and subsequently detecting the watermarks on the exiting flows.
B. Design Principles
From above application examples, we summarize a list of principles for designing flow watermarks. The challenge of building an efficient scheme lies in the difficulty of achieving all desired properties simultaneously.
• Robustness. One major advantage of flow watermarking over passive traffic analysis is the robustness against network noise. Take the stepping stone attack of Fig. 1 for example. The flow Alice sends back to Bob is subjected to jitter, packet drops, and packet splits during transmission. All these artifacts can alter the watermark, resulting in decoding errors. Without the ability to withstand these artifacts, flow watermarking is no different than passive analysis, which is fragile by nature. • Invisibility. A successful watermark pattern should stay 'invisible' to avoid possible attacks. For instance, in Fig. 2(a) , if the intruder notices that incoming flows contain watermarks, it can command the stepping stone to take precautionary actions (for instance, remove the watermarks altogether). • Blindness. In a blind watermarking scheme, the watermark pattern can be extracted without the help of the original flow [21] . On the contrary, the original flow must be present in order to detect nonblind watermarks. Again, consider the example of Fig. 2(a) . In order to detect the stepping stone, the enterprise needs to perform watermark decoding on all outgoing flows. If a nonblind detection scheme is used, all exit routers are required to obtain a copy of each incoming flow. The resulting overheads of bandwidth and storage make such schemes impractical in large enterprise networks. • Presence watermarking. In conventional digital watermarking (e.g., multimedia watermarking), often a large amount of hiding capacity is desired as the injected watermarks are frequently used to achieve copyright among many users [22] . This, fortunately, is not required for most flow watermarking applications, since the main purpose of injecting watermarks here is to link flows initiated from the same sources. In other words, in the digital watermarking terminology, zero-bit or presence watermarks suffice [21] . Therefore, when designing a flow watermarking scheme, one may trade the capacity for other properties such as robustness (see the discussion in Section IV-B).
C. Watermark Attack Models
The difficulty of maintaining watermark invisibility depends on the specific attack model. Based on the strength of the watermark attacker, attack models may be classified as follows:
• Level-I: the attacker observes the watermarked flow, and has knowledge of certain feature (e.g., empirical distributions of IPDs) of the original flow. • Level-II: the attacker observes the watermarked flow, and has a distorted version of the original flow. • Level-III: the attacker observes both the watermarked flow and the original flow. In Level-I, the weakest attack model, the attacker can only discover the presence of watermark by statistical approaches that real a deviation of known features from the norm in the original flow. For interval based schemes, the multiflow attack (MFA) exposes empty intervals in the combination of several watermarked flows [11] . For IPD-based schemes, the empirical distribution of IPDs, which should not be changed with high probability, distinguishes watermarked flows from unwatermarked ones via Kolmogorov-Simirnov (K-S) tests [9] , [13] . We show in Section V-C that our watermark does not introduce noticeable patterns for the MFA or the KS test to detect it.
In Level-II, given a distorted version of the original flow, the attacker has in effect an imperfect realization of the original flow signal which is more informative than the statistical information a Level-I attacker has. A Level-II attack, BACKLIT was recently proposed, where the attacker serves as a traffic relay between the client and server of a TCP connection and thus sees both the REQUEST and RESPONSE flows [23] . When watermarks are added, packets along one direction (i.e., RE-SPONSE) must be delayed. The attacker can detect this delayed timing pattern as he observes the clean flow in the REQUEST direction. BACKLIT works well when a strong correlation between the REQUEST and RESPONSE flows exists, in which case the attack has a high fidelity version of the original flow.
In Section V-C, we evaluate our scheme against BACKLIT. We show that in practice the correlation between the response and request flows are destroyed for the most part by network jitter because watermarks in our scheme that add very small perturbations to IPDs can remain hidden.
A Level-III attacker, who observes the exact original flow has a significantly easier task detecting the presence of a watermark [24] . This paper considered a known flow attack scenario, where watermark attackers can observe both the original flow and the watermarked flow, which is not practical in many cases. In this work, we focus on the first two attack models when evaluating watermark invisibility.
D. Related Work
We briefly review previous flow watermarking literature. To the best of our knowledge, all the previous schemes fail to meet at least one of the above design principles, necessitating the development of a comprehensive approach that meets all the aforementioned criteria.
Earlier flow watermarks are of interpacket-delay (IPD) based type. In [6] , the authors proposed an IPD based scheme that modulates the mean of selected IPDs using the QIM framework. Watermark synchronization is lost if enough packets are dropped or split. Therefore the scheme is unreliable. Another IPD based scheme was presented in [9] , where watermarks are added by enlarging or shrinking the IPDs. This nonblind scheme achieves some watermark resynchronizations when packets are dropped or split, but is not scalable as the original packet flow is required during decoding.
In interval based schemes, instead of using the IPDs between individual packets, the watermark pattern is encoded into batch packet characteristics within fixed time intervals. In [2] , an interval-centroid scheme was proposed. After dividing the flow into time intervals of the same length, the watermark embedder created two patterns by manipulating the centroid of packets within each interval. The modified centroids are not easily changed even after packets are delayed, lost or split. A similar design was presented in [8] , where the watermark pattern is embedded in the packet densities of predefined time intervals. One problem with interval based schemes is the lack of invisibility. Moving packets in batches generates visible artifacts, which can expose the watermark positions. Based on this observation, a multiflow attack (MFA) was proposed in [11] . The authors showed that by lining up as few as 10 watermarked flows, an attacker can observe a number of large [11, Figure 10] ) in the aggregate flow, revealing the watermark positions. Recently, a new interval based scheme was proposed in [25] . The main idea is that the exact locations of modified intervals depend on the flow pattern. This flow-dependent design reduces the success rate of MFA, but makes it more difficult to retrieve the correct intervals for decoding in face of strong network noise. Moreover, the perturbation introduced in the IPDs is large enough to make the scheme susceptible to Level-II attacks such as BACKLIT [23] . Table I compares existing flow watermarking schemes with our proposed scheme. Unlike previous work, the new scheme satisfies all the desired properties.
NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS
In the discussion of the rest of the paper, we use the following notation.
is a sequence of length , and is a subsequence in starting with index and ending with . Specially, if , is an empty sequence, denoted by . denotes the 'xor' operation.
We also define the following variables used in our scheme.
• is the IPD sequence of an original packet flow, where each delay, , is positive real-valued. • is the IPD sequence of the same flow after injection of the watermark pattern. • is the IPD sequence received by the watermark decoder.
• is the binary watermark sequence. • is a sparse version of , where . • is the sparsification factor and is integer-valued. • is the density of (see (2)). • is a pseudorandom binary key sequence. • is a binary sequence, generated from the watermark and the key , and embedded into flow IPDs. • is the decoder's estimate of . • the estimate of the watermark sequence at the decoder.
• is a real-valued step size used for IPD quantizations. It represents the strength of the watermark signal. • is the standard deviation of jitter. • and represent the probability of a substitution, an insertion, and a deletion event in the communication channel model of the network, respectively. is then embedded into flow IPDs using QIM. At the decoder, the IPDs are processed by a QIM decoder to extract the codeword , from which the IDS decoder recovers the watermark , subsequently. 
III. THE PROPOSED SCHEME
A. Overview of the System Fig. 3 depicts the schematic of our proposed scheme, which can be divided into two layers: the insertion-deletion-substitution (IDS) encoder/decoder and the quantization-index-modulation (QIM) encoder/decoder. In the upper layer, the watermark sequence is processed to generate an IDS error correction codeword . In the lower layer, a QIM framework is used to inject into the IPDs of the flow. QIM embedding is blind and causes little change to packet times [12] . Upon receiving the flow, the QIM decoder extracts the pattern Subsequently an IDS decoder recovers the watermark, , from this pattern. If we abstract the QIM encoder, the network, and the QIM decoder together as a channel, which takes as the input and spits out , flow watermarking is equivalent to solving the problem of sending one bit of information (the presence of the watermark) over this compound communication channel (see Fig. 4 ). Codes for this compound channel must withstand dependent substitution, deletion, and bursty insertion errors. We next introduce each component of our scheme in details.
B. Insertion-Deletion-Substitution (IDS) Encoder
Our IDS error correction scheme is inspired by [26] , [27] , where a marker code is employed to provide reliable communications over a channel with deletion and insertion errors. However, the approach in [26] , [27] is not directly applicable to our channel, as we need to deal with somewhat more complicated errors, such as dependent substitution, deletion, and bursty insertion errors which we discuss in Section IV-C2.
The IDS encoder works as follows. The watermark sequence is first sparsified into a longer sequence of length , as given by (1) where is a deterministic sparsification function that pads with zeros, and is known at the decoder. We denote by density the ratio of '1's in , i.e.,
is a decoding parameter shared with the IDS decoder. The sparsified watermark is then added to a key to form the codeword :
where is pseudorandom key sequence which is also known at the decoder.
Let us work on a small example of embedding one bit of watermark in a length 8 sequence. First is sparsified into an 8 bit sequence (the sparsification factor ). Then we add this sparse sequence to the first 8 bit of our key, . The resulting codeword is . Because is only different from the key at one position, the decoder could infer the positions of deleted or inserted bits by comparing the received codeword with the key. For instance, if the decoder receives a codeword , one bit shorter than the key, then it is very likely that a bit '1' from the second run was lost during transmission. Based on this observation, a probabilistic decoder can be developed to fully recover embedded bits, as will be discussed in Section IV-D.
Since is sparse, the codeword is close to the key, which is known at the IDS decoder. Therefore, the IDS encoding helps synchronize the lost and inserted bits at the cost of information capacity over the channel, which is not a concern for flow watermarking (see Section II-B).
C. Insertion-Deletion-Substitution (IDS) Channel 1) QIM Embedding: The codeword
is injected into IPDs of the original flow using QIM embedding. Given a quantization step size , the QIM encoder changes the IPD, , into an even (or odd) multiplier of given the embedded bit is a bit 0 (or 1). The IPDs after modifications are given by
for , where the ceiling function describes the operation that adds minimum delays to Packet to form the desired multiplier of . At the QIM decoder, each embedded bit is extracted based on whether a received IPD is closer to an even or odd quantizer, i.e., if , if .
(5) Fig. 5 . Example of substitution errors caused by network jitter. ' 's denote even quantizers and ' 's denote odd quantizers. The bit embedded in is '1,' but the decoded bit from (delay between received packets 0 and 1) is '0.'
2) Channel Model:
In presence of network artifacts, received IPDs, , may be different from the original IPDs , leading to errors in decoding . Substitution errors occur when network jitter alters IPDs largely. Fig. 5 depicts one example where an embedded bit is flipped by the jitter. In Fig. 5 , the bit ' ' was originally encoded in the IPD , resulting in . But at the QIM decoder, the received IPD is pushed by the jitter into interval , and thus decoded as ' '. In absence of packet drops or splits, a watermark bit flips if the IPD jitter is larger than . Following the observation of previous work that shows IPD jitter (within a certain period of time) is approximately i.i.d. zero-mean Laplace distributed [9] , the probability of a substitution error by jitter can be estimated as (6) where is the Laplacian PDF and is its variance. Decoding errors also occur when packets get dropped. As packet drops lead to the merger of successive IPDs, the resulting error contains both deletion and substitution, which we refer to as dependent deletion and substitution. For instance in Fig. 6 , deletion of Packet 1 merges the IPDs and into a large received IPD . As a result, instead of and , only one bit is received at the decoder. We consider this case as a deletion of , and possibly a substitution of . In this paper, we assume that each packet is dropped independently with probability .
The last type of errors come from packet insertions. This happens when packets are split to meet a smaller packet size limit, or when TCP transmission is triggered by network congestions. Both cases cause bursty insertions of packets. An example of such a scenario is depicted in Fig. 7 . Packet 2 is split into three smaller ones, creating two new IPDs (2-2' and 2'-2", both with zero length). Therefore, two extra '0' bits would be decoded in . In general, newly generated packets are mostly right next to the original one, hence we consider all inserted bits are '0's 2 . Furthermore, we assume the number of inserted packets follows a geometric distribution with parameter .
D. Insertion-Deletion-Substitution (IDS) Decoder
We estimate each watermark bit from using the maximum likelihood decoding rule given by (7) Since is a deterministic function of , we derive the likelihood in (7) based on the dependency between and 
where is the probability of a substitution error given in (6) . The remaining new bits (or ) are just '0' bits resulting from bursty packet insertions.
1) Hidden Markov Model (HMM):
To capture the evolution of newly decoded bits from the received flow, we define the state after sending each packet with the pair , for , where • The accumulated bit it the sum of all bits resulting from merger of the IPDs between Packet and the previous packet that was received at the decoder. If Packet was received, then is just the bit embedded on the IPD between Packet and , i.e., . On the other hand, if Packet was completely lost (i.e., after its deletion, there were no insertions), would be the sum of current bit and bits embedded on previously merged IPDs, i.e.,
. To sum up, w.p. , w.p.
.
Recall from (3) that is generated using the key and the sparse watermark sequence . We model the sparse watermark bits 's as independent random variables. Therefore (9) can be rewritten as w.p. , w.p. , w.p. , w.p. . (10) Additionally, note that from (9), we can rewrite (8) as w.p. , w.p. .
• The drift , calculated as the number of packet insertions -the number of packet deletions before Packet , is the shift in position of the sent Packet in the received flow, i.e., if Packet was not lost, it would appear at position in the received flow. Given , the drift of Packet is updated as w.p. , w.p. , (12) where the first case occurs when Packet was dropped with no new packets inserted, and the second case occurs when total of packets were received either because Packet was dropped and there were insertions, or Packet was received and there were insertions. For the first Packet 0, we initialize . Combine (10) and (11) , and given , we have:
Equation (13) captures the HMM with the hidden states of and the observation states of , as illustrated by Fig. 8 . The state transition probabilities can be derived using (10), (12) and (13) , as summarized in (14) , at the bottom of the next page.
For example, after sending Packet , the system state is . If Packet is lost and no packets are inserted, then from (12) the drift of Packet becomes , and no new bit is decoded, i.e., is an empty sequence. Additionally, the IPD between Packet and Packet is added to previously merged IPDs such that is decided based on the last two cases in (10) . Overall, the transition probability in this scenario is given by
2) Forward-Backward Algorithm: For the HMM in Fig. 8 , we apply the forward-backward algorithm [28] to derive the posterior probabilities , . Let us define the forward quantity as the joint probability of bits decoded before sending Packet at the hidden state of , which is given by (17) The forward quantities can be computed recursively using transition probabilities in (14) as (18) Similarly, we define the backward quantity as the conditional probability of decoding the rest of the bits in the received flow, , given the current state ,
The backward quantities can also be computed recursively as (20) Given the forward and backward quantities, the likelihood of the watermark bit is given by (21) where the first equality follows from our watermark sparsification function in (1) , and the quantity is defined as (22) for , which can be calculated recursively as (23) where is given by (15) , at the bottom of the page.
Once the likelihoods of all watermark bits are calculated, the watermark sequence can be estimated using maximum likelihood rule of (7) . Finally, the presence of the watermark in a flow is decided based on the correlation value of the estimated watermark and the original watermark sequence .
IV. EVALUATION
We tested our scheme for two groups of traces [29] , which represent typical traffic in human-involved interactive network connections, where flow watermarks are most applicable.
A. Parameter Selection
The first test examined the effects of watermark length and IPD quantization step size . We varied over {10, 30, 50}, over {20, 60, 100} ms, and fixed the sparisificatoin factor . The deletion and insertion probabilities and the network jitter were set to , , and , respectively. 5000 synthetic flows were embedded with watermarks and another 5000 unwatermarked ones served as the control group. Table II shows the true positive rates of our test, when false positive rates are kept under 1%. As we increase watermark length or quantization step size (embed a 'stronger' pattern), detection error decreases.
For the rest of tests in this section, we fixed the watermark parameters to , which had the best performance in Table II .
B. Robustness Tests
We evaluated watermark robustness against network jitter, and packet drops and splits.
1) IPD Jitter: From the experimental results in [25] , the standard deviation of the Laplacian jitter was estimated as . We performed tests with varied over {10, 20, 30, 40} ms. The packet drop and split probabilities were and , respectively. This time, we watermarked 1000 flows from both synthetic and SSH traces.
The true positive rates are given in Table III . Notice that the watermarks were detected with accuracies over 98%, even when jitter was as high as 20 ms. The detection performance falls sharply when jitter standard deviations exceeds 40 ms. However, such excessively large jitter rarely occurs at proper network conditions. Hence, our scheme withstands network jitter in normal operating conditions.
2) Packet Deletion and Insertion: One major improvement of our design over previous work is robustness against packet deletions and insertions. To verify this, we tested our scheme in a network with: solely packet deletion with probabilities , solely packet insertion with probabilities , and both deletion and insertion with probabilities . During all tests, the standard deviation of jitter was fixed as , and 1000 flows from both synthetic and SSH traces were used.
The results in Tables IV -VI demonstrate watermarks were detected with high accuracies when as many as 5% of packets were dropped and inserted.
C. Visibility Tests
We evaluated watermark invisibility with two tests: the Kolmogorov-Simirnov (KS) test and the multiflow attack (MFA) test.
KS test is commonly applied to comparing distributions of data sets. Given two data sets, the KS distance is computed as the maximum difference of their empirical distribution functions [13] . For two flows and , the KS distance is given by , where and are the empirical CDFs of IPDs in and . We claim two flows are indistinguishable if their KS distance is below 0.036, a threshold suggested in [13] . We calculated the average KS distance between watermarked and unwatermarked flows using both synthetic and SSH traces. The results are tabulated in Tables VII and VIII. None of the KS distances exceed the detection threshold of visibility, which implies the embedded watermarks did not cause noticeable artifacts in the original packet flows.
MFA is a watermark attack that detects positions of embedded watermarks in interval based schemes; when flows embedded with the same watermark are aggregated, the aggregate flow shows a number of intervals containing no packets (see [11, Figure 10] ). To test whether such visible pattern exists in flows watermarked using our scheme, we combined 10 watermarked and 10 unwatermarked flows for both the synthetic and SSH traces, and divided the aggregated flows into intervals with length 70 ms. We then counted the number of blank intervals with no packets in each aggregate flow. This procedure was repeated 1000 times, and the resulting blank interval statistics are shown in Tables IX and X. For both the synthetic and SSH traces, we see that the number of blank intervals does not change much after watermarks were embedded. Fig. 9 depicts packet counts in each interval of length 70 ms in the aggregated synthetic traces. Comparing Fig. 9(a) with Fig. 9(b) , no clear watermark pattern is observed. The same observation can be made in Fig. 10 , which depicts packet counts of SSH traces. Therefore, our scheme is resistant to MFA. We next tested the performance of our watermarks under a Level-II attack, BACKLIT, where the attacker sees both directions of a TCP connection [23] . BACKLIT detects watermarks in SSH flows based on the differences in round trip times (RTTs) of consecutive TCP requests, . We considered a stepping stone detection scenario in our campus network. Network jitter in such an environment, like most enterprise networks, is very small. According to our measurements from our lab machine to the campus exit node, the jitter standard deviation is as low as . For this level of noise, a small quantization step size of IPDs, 10 ms, is sufficient to achieve accurate decoding performances (true positive rate of 100% and false positive rate of less than 1%). We then examined the effect of our watermarks on the distribution of a SSH connection, by monitoring the RTT jitter from our lab to 5 PlanetLab nodes [30] . For each node, we issued 4000 ping requests with ping interval of 100 ms, and divided ping packets into two windows, each consisting of 2000 packets. We transplanted delays of SSH packets during watermarking onto the ping replies in Window-1, to mimic the effects of watermarking live TCP requests, and left Window-2 untouched as the control group. Fig. 11 depicts the CDFs of of Window-1, Window-1 with watermarks, and Window-2. We notice that except in Fig. 11(a) , where the RTT jitter to the destination node is extremely low, the watermarked flow is not distinguishable from the unwatermarked flow. Our results indicate that BACKLIT only works in clean environments with negligible jitter, and the subtle watermark we inject remains invisible when moderate jitter exists.
To achieve simultaneous watermark robustness and invisibility, we embed a sparse watermark using the QIM embedding into flow IPDs. Modeling the network jitter, deletions, and insertions as a communication channel descried by a HMM, and employing an IDS decoder, we can reliably decode the watermark. The QIM embedding meanwhile guarantees that watermark remains invisible to attackers.
